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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Petitioner/Plaintiff, 
v. 
MIGUEL ANGEL LARA, 
Respondent/Defendant. 
Case No. 20030939-SC 
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S POINT LA 
A, Under Utah rules and case law, an appellate court loses jurisdiction over an 
appeal upon a timely, proper remittitur. 
Defendant argues, in effect, that remittitur does not mark the end of an appellate 
court's jurisdiction because no statute, rule, or case expressly says that an appellate court 
cannot reinstate a dismissed appeal after remittitur. Br. Resp. 15-24. While no statute, rule, 
or case specifically states this, the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from this Court's 
rules and case law is that an appellate court loses jurisdiction to reinstate an appeal dismissed 
by the appellant once remittitur has properly issued. 
As defendant correctly notes, remittitur is governed by rule 36, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. Under that rule, this Court may not issue the remittitur until "15 days 
after the entry of the judgment." Utah R. App. P. 36(a)(1). But if "a petition for rehearing 
is timely filed, the remittitur of the court shall issue five days after the entry of the order 
1 
disposing of the petition." Id. In the court of appeals, remittitur "shall issue immediately 
after the expiration of the time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari/5 i.e., 30 days after 
entry of the court of appeals' final decision. Utah R. App. P. 36(a)(2); Utah R. App. P. 48(a) 
& (c). If a petition for certiorari review is timely filed, remittitur by the court of appeals is 
"automatically . . . stayed until the Supreme Court's disposition on the petition for writ of 
certiorari." Utah R. App. P. 36(a)(2). If the petition is denied, the remittitur issues five days 
after the denial. If the petition is granted, "jurisdiction of the appeal shall be transferred to 
the Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals shall close its file and transfer the record on 
appeal, if any, to the Supreme Court," Id Rule 36 permits the time for issuing the remittitur 
to be "stayed, enlarged, or shortened by order of the court." Utah R. App. P. 36(a)(3). 
Although rule 36 does not expressly say that an appellate court loses jurisdiction upon 
remittitur, its provisions admit no other logical conclusion. Rule 36 delays remittitur until 
after the time has passed for filing a petition for rehearing or certiorari review or until after 
the relevant appellate court has ruled on those petitions. The fact that the rule does not allow 
remittitur until after the appellate court has nothing more to rule on implicitly recognizes that 
the appellate court may not act on an appeal once it has been remitted to the trial court. This 
conclusion is supported by rule 36(a)(3), which allows that the time for remittitur to be 
stayed, enlarged, or shortened. If remittitur did not mark the end of the appellate court's 
jurisdiction, there would be no need to stay or enlarge the time for remittitur. 
That remittitur signals the end of appellate jurisdiction is also supported by Utah's 
appellate jurisdictional scheme. It is well-settled that, except for collateral matters, a trial 
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court loses jurisdiction upon the filing of a timely notice of appeal. See White v. State, 795 
P.2d 648, 650 (Utah 1990) (per curiam); Saunders v. Sharp, 818 P.2d 574, 577-78 (Utah 
App. 1991). Jurisdiction is returned to the trial court only when it receives the remittitur 
from the appellate court. See Chase Manhattan Bank v. Principal Funding Corp., 2004 UT 
9, f 9, 89 P.3d 109. Thus, until the appellate court relinquishes appellate jurisdiction, the 
trial court is generally prohibited from acting on the case. See id. at ffif 9, 12 n.l. 
The interplay between rules 48 and 36, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, illustrates 
this point. Under rule 48, the time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari runs "not from 
the date of the issuance of the remittitur," but from the date the court of appeals' decision is 
entered. Utah R. App. P. 48(c). In other words, certiorari review must be sought while the 
court of appeals retains jurisdiction over the appeal. Rule 36 provides that if this Court 
grants the petition, the court of appeals may not return jurisdiction to the trial court by 
remitting the case; rather, the court of appeals must transfer "jurisdiction of the appeal" to 
this Court. Utah R. App. 36(a)(2) (emphasis added). In short, Utah's rules treat remittitur 
as a jurisdictional event. 
Contrary to defendant's argument, this Court recognized this jurisdictional view of 
remittitur in Chase Manhattan Bank. Although Chase Manhattan Bank did riot deal with 
reinstatement of an appeal after remittitur, it described remittitur in jurisdictional terms: 
"Remittitur is not an order of the appellate court, but merely gives the trial court such 
jurisdiction as it needs to implement the appellate court's decision in the matter." 2004 UT 
9, f^ 9 (emphasis added). Or stated differently, "[remittitur is a formal revesting of 
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jurisdiction with the trial court after appellate proceedings and is governed by the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure." Id. As explained in the State's opening brief, if remittitur revests 
jurisdiction with the trial court, logic dictates that "the jurisdiction of an appellate court over 
a case is generally lost on the issuance and transmission of the mandate or remittitur." 5 
CJ.S. Appeal and Error § 1011 (1993). Indeed, the court of appeals itself has recognized 
this basic appellate jurisdictional rule: "Having remitted the case, this court lost jurisdiction 
over the matter and therefore the dismissal of defendant's April 1993 appeal became an 
adjudication on the merits." State v. Clark, 913 P.2d 360, 363 (Utah App. 1996). 
Judge Bench was thus correct when he explained that if an appellate court loses 
jurisdiction upon remittitur, it follows that it can regain jurisdiction of the appeal only if it 
has the authority to recall the remittitur. See State v. Lara, 2003 UT App 318, ^ [41 (Bench, 
J., dissenting). As this Court recognized in Miller, "[i]n the absence of a statute or rule of 
court to the contrary, the great weight of judicial authority" is that an appellate court is 
"without jurisdiction to recall the remittitur except upon a showing that the remittitur was 
issued through fraud or inadvertence or was issued prematurely or otherwise improperly, or 
to correct an irregularity or error in the issuance of the remittitur." Miller v. Southern Pacific 
Co., 82 Utah 307, 24 P.2d 380, 381 (1933). In other words, once an appeal has been 
dismissed and remitted, the appellate court may not reopen and reinstate the appeal unless 
it can recall the remittitur. The appellate court can recall the remittitur only if there was some 
4 
defect in issuing it.1 
Neither defendant nor the court of appeals has ever suggested that the remittitur in 
defendant's first appeal was issued prematurely, fraudulently, or inadvertently, or that it 
suffered from any other defect. Nor did the court of appeals purport to recall the remittitur 
in the dismissed appeal. The court of appeals instead merely declared in this second untimely 
appeal that the prior appeal was reinstated, a year after it had been dismissed and remitted 
on defendant's own motion. Because the remittitur was timely and properly issued, the court 
of appeals lacked jurisdiction to reopen and reinstate the appeal. 
B. Defendant's authority does not allow an appellate court to reinstate an appeal 
dismissed on an appellant's motion a year after remittitur has issued. 
Despite the foregoing authority, defendant relies on rule 23 A, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, State v. Turtle, 713 P.2d 703, 704 (Utah 1985), and other cases to argue that an 
appellate court retains jurisdiction to reinstate dismissed appeals long after remittitur. None 
of those authorities supports defendant's claim, particularly in this context, where the initial 
appeal was dismissed on defendant's own motion and affidavit under the provisions of rule 
37(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
defendant asserts Miller is inapplicable because the Court in that case did not 
ultimately decide whether the remittitur should, or even could, be recalled. Miller is 
nevertheless authoritative because it correctly sets forth the general rule as supported by 
"the great weight of judicial authority." See Miller, 24 P.2d at 381. See also See 5 C J.S. 
Appeal and Error § 1101 (1993) ("The rules most generally adhered to are that an 
appellate court is without power to recall a mandate regularly issued without 
inadvertence, fraud, prematurity, or misapprehension, and that it will not recall the 
mandate for the purpose of reexamining the cause on the merits, or to correct judicial 
error"). 
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Rule 23A. Defendant first points to rule 23 A as an example of when an appellate 
court may reinstate an appeal after remittitur. Br. Resp. 15-16. In fact, rule 23 A has no such 
provision. Rule 23 A provides that an appeal "dismissed for failure to take a step other than 
the timely filing of a notice of appeal may be reinstated by the court upon a motion of the 
appellant for (a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect or (b) fraud, 
misrepresentation, or misconduct of an adverse party." Rule 23 A requires, however, that the 
motion to reinstate be filed "within a reasonable time after entry of the order of dismissal." 
Defendant concedes, as he must, that rule 23A does not apply to this case. See Br. 
Resp. 16. This is because an appellant's motion to dismiss his own appeal is never "for 
failure to take a step" in the appellate process. Moreover, appeals dismissed on an 
appellant's own motion are expressly governed by a different appellate rule—rule 37(b). 
Defendant nevertheless asserts that rule 23 A supports his position because it permits 
an appellate court to reinstate an appeal "within a reasonable time." Defendant reasons that 
"within a reasonable time" must include after remittitur issues, otherwise the rule would have 
used more precise language. Br. Resp. 16. But nothing in the phrase "within a reasonable 
time" suggests that an appellate court may reinstate an appeal once remittitur has been timely 
and properly issued. Indeed, when viewed in light of subpoint A above, "within a reasonable 
time" must mean before remittitur. As stated, once a case has been dismissed for any reason, 
including an appellant's failure to take a step in the appellate process, remittitur is delayed 
for at least 30 days in the court of appeals and 15 days in this Court. Utah R. App. P. 36(a). 
That delay is a "reasonable time" for an appellant to move to reinstate the appeal under rule 
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23A. Conversely, it would be highly unreasonable for an appellant whose appeal has been 
dismissed for failure to file a docketing statement—to take a common example—to wait until 
after remittitur, when jurisdiction has been returned to the trial court, to seek reinstatement. 
But again, as defendant has conceded, rule 23 A does not apply to dismissals obtained 
under rule 37(b). Thus, even if rule 23 A did permit an untimely reinstatement of appeals 
dismissed for failure to take a step, it does not permit that action when the defendant actively 
seeks and obtains a dismissal. Certainly, rule 37(b), which governs defendant's dismissal, 
makes no provision for seeking reinstatement a year after dismissal. 
Premature remittiturs. As further support that an appellate court may reinstate an 
appeal long after remittitur, defendant cites two Utah decisions: Hi-Country Estates 
Homeowners Assoc, v. Foothills Water Co., 942 P.2d 305 (Utah 1996) mdAcosta v. Labor 
Comm % 2002 UT App 67,44 P.3d 819. These decisions in fact support the State's position 
that a timely, proper remittitur marks the end of appellate jurisdiction. 
Both Hi-Country and Acosta dealt with the court of appeals' jurisdiction to recall a 
premature remittitur. As stated, Rule 36 provides that remittitur should not issue until after 
the time for seeking certiorari reviewed has expired. In Hi-Country, the court of appeals 
erroneously issued the remittitur before that time had expired. Hi-Country, 942 P.2d at 305-
06. The plaintiffs filed a timely petition for certiorari review and moved the court of appeals 
to recall the remittitur. Id. at 306. The court of appeals refused, instead directing the 
plaintiffs to seek a stay in the trial court. Id. The trial court denied the stay and modified its 
prior judgment in accordance with the court of appeals' opinion and remittitur. Id. 
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Meanwhile, this Court granted the petition for certiorari review. Id. This Court held that the 
court of appeals erred both in prematurely issuing the remittitur and then in refusing to recall 
it. Id. at 306. The Court reasoned that because the court of appeals issued the remittitur 
prematurely, "jurisdiction was never returned to the trial court" and the trial court's 
modification was invalid. Id. at 306 
In Acosta, the court of appeals again prematurely issued the remittitur. 2002 UT App 
67, fflf 12-16. The court of appeals dismissed Acosta's appeal because she had not timely 
filed her opening brief, but then gave her ten days to cure her default. Id. at ^ f 6. Before the 
appeal was remitted, the appellant sought for and received an extension of time in which to 
file her brief. Id. The court of appeals, however, inadvertently remitted the appeal before 
the time for filing the brief had expired. Id. When Acosta asked to reinstate her appeal, the 
court of appeals recalled the remittitur and set a new briefing schedule. Id. Relying on Hi-
Country, the court of appeals reasoned that it had jurisdiction to recall the remittitur because 
it was premature and "'jurisdiction was never returned to the trial court.'" Id. at ^ f 13 (quoting 
Hi-Country, 942 P.2d at 306) (emphasis added by court of appeals)). 
Neither Hi-Country nor Acosta, then, holds that an appellate court may reinstate an 
appeal after a timely remittitur. Rather, both stand only for the proposition that a premature 
remittitur is ineffectual and that an appellate court retains jurisdiction until a proper, timely 
remittitur has been issued. That proposition is fully consistent with the general rule—that 
an appellate court is "without jurisdiction to recall the remittitur except upon a showing that 
the remittitur was issued through fraud or inadvertence or was issued prematurely or 
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otherwise improperly, or to correct an irregularity or error in the issuance of the remittitur." 
M'/fer, 24 P.2d at 381. 
In sum, an ineffectual remittitur does not divest the appellate court of jurisdiction. 
Rather, an appellate court always retains jurisdiction to recall a prematurely or otherwise 
erroneously issued remittitur. But when a remittitur is timely and properly issued, the 
appellate court does lose jurisdiction and may not recall the remittitur. Certainly, neither Hi-
Country nor Acosta hold that an appellate court may reinstate an appeal that was timely and 
properly remitted a year earlier. 
LaFaver v. Turner. Defendant also cites LaFaver v. Turner, 395 P.2d 359 (Utah 
1964), to support his claim that an appellate court may reinstate an appeal long after 
remittitur. Br. Resp. 20. That half-page decision, issued over 40 years ago, does not support 
defendant's claim. While that case does involve a reinstatement of an appeal dismissed for 
lack of prosecution, the decision gives no information on how long the case had been 
dismissed before reinstatement, whether the case had ever been remitted, what procedural 
rules governed at the time, or even what procedure was invoked for obtaining reinstatement. 
LaFaver, 395 P.2d at 359. In short, given the lack of crucial information in the decision, 
LaFaver sheds no light on whether remittitur marks the end of appellate jurisdiction. 
Tuttle. Like the court of appeals, defendant relies primarily on Tuttle—the escape 
case—as evidence that "Utah appellate courts have the ability to reinstate appeals after the 
issuance of the remittitur." Br.Resp. 17-18. Defendant asserts this Court "reinstated Tuttle's 
appeal even though the time for issuance of the remittitur had long since passed." Id. 
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But it is not at all clear from Tattle that this Court had in fact issued the remittitur 
before reinstating the appeal. According to the opinion, Turtle escaped on August 21,1984, 
and was captured about six months later, on February 7,1985. State v. Turtle, 713 P.2d 703, 
704 (Utah 1985). The opinion then states that Turtle's appeal was dismissed "[w]hile he was 
free." Id. This Court reinstated Turtle's appeal by minute order six months after his capture, 
on August 15, 1985. Id. 
Defendant concludes from the foregoing that Turtle's appeal was remitted "almost a 
year before the appeal was reinstated." Br. Resp. 18. This conclusion relies on two 
unsupported assumptions. First, it assumes that Turtle's appeal was dismissed when he 
escaped, in August 1984. The opinion, however, merely states that the appeal was dismissed 
sometime during the six months while Turtle was free. Thus, the appeal may have been 
dismissed in January or February 1985, toward the end of the six months. Second, 
defendant's conclusion assumes that the appeal was remitted two weeks after dismissal, 
because the then-applicable rule set remittitur at 15 days. See Br. Resp. 18. Yet the 
existence of that rule does not necessarily mean that remittitur issued exactly 15 days after 
dismissal. Remittitur could have been delayed. Or remittitur may not have issued at all. The 
Turtle decision does not say how much time elapsed between the dismissal of the appeal and 
defendant's motion to reinstate the appeal. Thus, it is possible that defendant was captured 
and filed his motion to reinstate the appeal before the case was ever remitted. In short, 
nothing in Turtle supports defendant's claim that an appellate court retains jurisdiction to 
reinstate an appeal once the case has been timely and properly remitted. 
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But even if Tuttle could be read as an example of reinstatement after remittitur, the 
court of appeals erred in applying Tuttle to rule 37(b) dismissals. Like the court of appeals, 
defendant mistakenly reads Tuttle's holding as having broad application: "Tuttle tells us 
. . . that when the state constitutional right to appeal is jeopardized by a dismissal, 
reinstatement is required without reference to the passage of time except as it relates to 
prejudice to the state." Br. Resp. 19. 
In fact, the Tuttle court carefully limited its holding to a narrow category of 
cases—criminal appeals "dismissed after escape": 
In light of the fundamental nature of the right to appellate review of a criminal 
conviction and the lack of any sound practical or policy justification for 
refusing to hear the appeals of escapees after they are returned to custody, we 
conclude that a criminal appeal dismissed after escape may be reinstated 
unless the State can show that it has been prejudiced by the defendant's 
absence and the consequent lapse of time. 
Tuttle, 713 P.2d at 705 (emphasis added). The Court's precise language evinces its intent 
that Tuttle apply only to appeals dismissed because of an appellant's fugitive status. 
This Court's reasoning in Tuttle's further supports that conclusion. As explained in 
the State's opening brief, Tuttle rejected established precedent prohibiting reinstatement of 
an escapee's appeal because it was based on the "questionable assumption" that "one who 
escapes has actually made a decision to abandon an appeal." Id. at 704. The Court reasoned 
that routinely denying reinstatement of an escapee's appeal upon a return to custody really 
amounted to an impermissible "imposition by this Court of a punishment for escape." Id. at 
704-05. Noting the "fundamental nature of the right to appellate review of a criminal 
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conviction," this Court stated that it could think of no "sound practical or policy justification 
for refusing to hear the appeals of escapees after they are returned to custody." Id at 705. 
Clearly, Turtle's holding was driven, first, by the concern that a fugitive could unwittingly 
lose his right to appeal merely by escaping, and second, by the concern that automatically 
dismissing such appeals would unfairly punish defendants for unrelated conduct. 
In assuming that Turtle's narrow rule applies to this case, both defendant and the court 
of appeals ignore important differences between appeals dismissed because of escape and 
appeals, like this one, dismissed under rule 37(b). While a fugitive may unintentionally lose 
his state constitutional right to appeal by escaping, rule 37(b) ensures that appeals dismissed 
under its provisions are intentional, knowing, and voluntary. First, an appeal dismissed under 
rule 37(b) can never be inadvertent because it requires the appellant to file a motion to 
dismiss. Second, rule 37(b) requires that a motion to dismiss a criminal appeal be 
accompanied by the "appellant'spersonal affidavit demonstrating that appellant's decision 
to dismiss the appeal is voluntary and made with knowledge of the right to an appeal and an 
understanding of the consequences of voluntary dismissal." Utah R. App. P. 37(b) (emphasis 
added). Thus, while a fugitive may be unaware that his appeal will be dismissed, a rule 37(b) 
movant will not only be personally informed of the dismissal, but he will also have assured 
the appellate court in a sworn affidavit that he wants the dismissal, he understands the 
consequences of asking for the dismissal, and his request is voluntary. Finally, granting an 
appellant's rule 37(b) motion to dismiss could never be considered an unfair punishment 
because it is done at the appellant's request. 
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To read Turtle as granting an appellate court endless jurisdiction to reinstate rule 37(b) 
dismissals invites manipulation of the system. For example, a defendant may decide to 
dismiss an appeal because he reasonably believes that he can obtain a speedier or better result 
through some other avenue. Or he may forego his appeal for personal or family reasons, such 
as a desire to not put his family or the victim through further trauma. As explained, a 
defendant can obtain a dismissal only by personally assuring the appellate court that he 
wants the dismissal and that he understands the consequences of his request. Under 
defendant's and the court of appeals' reasoning, defendant can have his appeal reinstated a 
year or more later merely by alleging that his assurances were, in fact, false. Such a rule 
would foster "invited error," something this Court has always eschewed. See State v. 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 31, 12 P.3d 92 (refusing "to give defendants the benefit of 
traditional plain error analysis where doing so would create an incentive for invited error"); 
State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997) (refusing to review a claim where trial 
counsel consciously chose not to object because to do otherwise "would be sanctioning a 
procedure that fosters invited error"). 
Reading Tuttle to apply to this category of appeals also effectively suspends the 
finality of all dismissals. If an appellate court can always revisit the validity of a defendant's 
assurances in a rule 37(b) dismissal, then it can also always revisit the validity of all 
dismissals, including those issued under rule 23A or due to lack of jurisdiction. 
Consequently, neither this Court nor the State can ever truly consider a dismissed appeal as 
a closed case. Such a result contravenes the "'interest of the state [that] requires that there 
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be an end to litigation—a maxim which comports with common sense as well as public 
policy.'" State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ^ f 25,70 P.3d 111 (citations omitted). And contrary 
to defendant's intimations, this interest is an important one. Not only does endless litigation 
unnecessarily and unfairly tap limited judicial and state resources, but it also takes an unfair 
emotional toll on victims and their family members, who are denied closure. 
In short, Tuttle does not support defendant's argument or the court of appeals' 
decision. Nor would its application to voluntary dismissals further any sound policy or 
protect any important right. Whatever its merits in the narrow class of cases to which it 
applies, Tuttle should not be extended to unrelated contexts. 
C. Utah statutes and the open courts provision do not require reinstatement of 
appeals dismissed on an appellant's own motion a year earlier. 
Defendant finally relies on Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(l) (West 2004) and our state 
constitution's open courts provision as proof that "Utah appellate courts have broad power 
to reinstate validly filed appeals." Br. Resp. 24-26. The State has never argued that Utah 
appellate courts lack jurisdiction to reinstate validly filed appeals. Rather, the State 
maintains that Utah appellate courts lack jurisdiction to reinstate validly remitted appeals. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-3. Defendant first points to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-3(l), 
which grants the court of appeals jurisdiction "to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue 
all writs and process necessary: (a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction." Br. Resp. 24. The court of appeals did not rely on this statutory 
provision for authority to reinstate defendant's appeal. To the extent that defendant argues 
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this Court should affirm on this alternative ground, the statute is inapplicable. 
The statutory phrase "in aid of its jurisdiction" implicitly presumes that the court of 
appeals already has jurisdiction. That phrase does not purport to confer jurisdiction where 
it is otherwise absent. Section 78-3a-3(a) does not vest an appellate court with jurisdiction 
a year after the case is timely and validly remitted any more than it creates jurisdiction where 
the notice of appeal is filed a year after the order appealed from is entered. 
Open courts provision. Defendant next claims that placing time limits on when a 
criminal appeal may be reinstated would violate the open courts provision of the state 
constitution. Br. Resp. 25-26. Again, the court of appeals did not rely on this provision in 
reinstating defendant's appeal. Nor could it have, because that provision does not apply here. 
The open courts provision states: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall have a remedy by due course of law, 
which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in the 
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
Utah Const. Art. I, § 11 (emphasis added). 
By its terms the open courts provision applies only to civil causes seeking a remedy 
for injuries done to an individual's "person, property or reputation." See Laney v. Fairview 
City, 2002 UT 79, ^ j 31,57 P.3d 1007 (in addition to establishing independent judiciary, open 
courts provision intended to give individuals judicial for "protection of their person, property, 
or reputation from abrogation and unreasonable limitation by economic interests that could 
control state legislatures"). Having an appeal, criminal or civil, dismissed on one's own 
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motion is not an injury to one's "person, property or reputation." In addition, the State is 
unaware of any authority that the open courts provision prohibits the setting of reasonable 
time limits for seeking appellate review. If such a limitation does not violate the open courts 
provision, placing limits on the time for reinstating dismissed appeals does not. 
D. This Court's decision in Houskeeper controls this case. 
Defendant asserts that State v. Houskeeper does not apply to this case, despite 
acknowledging that it presents nearly identical procedural facts. Br. Resp. 31-34. As 
explained in the State's opening brief, both defendant and Houskeeper filed a timely notice 
of appeal from the juvenile court's bindover order; both moved the court of appeals to 
dismiss their timely appeals, and both waited until after conviction in district court to file a 
second, untimely notice of appeal from the juvenile court bindover. Houskeeper, 2002 UT 
118, f 23, 62 P.3d 444. 
Based on those procedural facts, Houskeeper set out two well-settled propositions: (1) 
"Failure to timely file an appeal pursuant to rule 4 [Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure] 
constitutes a waiver of the right to appeal"; and (2) "[FJailure to timely file deprives an 
appellate court of jurisdiction over the appeal." Id. This Court then explained that it lacked 
jurisdiction to now review the juvenile court bindover order because even though 
Houskeeper had filed a timely notice of appeal from that order, "he voluntarily withdrew the 
appeal, which was ordered dismissed by the court of appeals." Id. This Court concluded, 
"defendant waived his right to appeal the bind-over order," just as he would have waived his 
right to appeal if he had filed no notice of appeal at all. In other words, a "notice of appeal 
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filed and dismissed voluntarily is gone, no more effective in conferring jurisdiction on a court 
than a notice never filed." Barrow v. Falck, 911 F.2d 1100, 1103 (7th Cir. 1992). 
Defendant and the court of appeals sei ze on Houskeeper's use of the phrase 
"voluntarily withdrew the appeal" to distinguish this case. They assert that because 
Houskeeper did not ask to reinstate his timely appeal,"' [voluntariness was taken for granted 
in that case, and it was precisely because of that voluntariness that Houskeeper's right to 
appeal was considered waived.'" Br. Resp. 32 (quoting Lara, 2003 UT App 318, \ 13). 
Thus, they conclude, this case '"presents a threshold issue not present in Houskeeper'" Id. 
The "voluntariness" of Houskeeper's motion to dismiss, in fact, had nothing to do 
with this Court's conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction. By describing Houskeeper's 
dismissal as voluntary, this Court was not commenting on whether that dismissal met 
constitutional standards of voluntariness. Nor did that phrase suggest that this Court assumed 
constitutional voluntariness. Rather, the Court used that phrase only as a term of art to 
explain that the case was dismissed on Houskeeper's motion to withdraw the appeal, as 
opposed to being dismissed over his objection. 
The ordinary usage of "voluntary dismissal" in the civil context, coupled with the title 
and text of rule 37(b), confirms this. Rule 41(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, entitled 
"Voluntary Dismissal; Effect Thereof, " sets out the procedure a civil plaintiff must follow 
to obtain a dismissal of a lawsuit. Cases commonly refer to dismissals under rule 41(a) as 
"voluntary dismissals." See, e.g., First Equity Federal, Inc. v. Phillips Dev. Co., 2002 UT 
56, t 4, 52 P.3d 1137; Rohan v. Boseman, 2002 UT App 109, ffif 20-23, 46 P.3d 753. By 
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using those terms, courts are not suggesting that the plaintiff s dismissal was voluntary in the 
constitutional sense; rather they are simply using the title of the applicable rule as a shorthand 
way of saying the plaintiff dismissed his own lawsuit. 
Rule 37(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, is also entitled "Voluntary Dismissal." 
Rule 37(b) sets out the procedure an appellant must follow to obtain a dismissal of his 
appeal, civil or criminal. Thus, when this Court said that Houskeeper 'Voluntarily dismissed" 
his appeal, it was not deciding or assuming that Houskeeper's motion was constitutionally 
voluntary. Rather, it was simply stating that the appellant moved to dismiss his own appeal. 
This Court, then, lacked jurisdiction over Houskeeper's appeal from the juvenile court 
bindover order, not because the initial dismissal was constitutionally voluntary, but because 
the later appeal was untimely. Like Houskeeper, defendant's appeal from the juvenile court 
bindover order was also untimely. Defendant, like Houskeeper, initially sought timely 
appellate review of that order. Later, also like Houskeeper, he dismissed that appeal by 
assuring the court of appeals that he wanted to dismiss, knew the consequences of 
dismissing, and understood that the appeal could not be reinstated.2 Then, also like 
Houskeeper, defendant filed a second notice of appeal after the time for appealing had 
passed. Thus, the court of appeals, here, like this Court in Houskeeper, lacked jurisdiction 
to entertain defendant's appeal or to delve into a factual inquiry concerning defendant's 
2Although the Houskeeper opinion is silent on this point, Houskeeper could only 
have obtained a dismissal of his appeal by submitting an affidavit swearing that his 
"decision to dismiss the appeal is voluntary and made with knowledge of the right to an 
appeal and an understanding of the consequences of voluntary dismissal." Utah R. App. 
P. 37(b). 
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motives for dismissing his timely appeal. It was empowered only to dismiss. See Bradbury 
v. Valencia, 2000 UT 50, f 8, 5 P.3d 649. 
Defendant attempts to circumvent the time limit for appealing by suggesting that his 
conditional plea reserved the right, not to appeal the juvenile court's bindover order, but "the 
right to appeal the propriety of the district court's jurisdiction." Br. Resp. 33. The State 
agrees that the court of appeals had jurisdiction to review the district court's decision that it 
lacked authority to review the juvenile court's bindover order, because defendant's notice 
of appeal was timely as to that order. Defendant, however, never asked the court of appeals 
to reverse any order of the district court. Rather, he asked the court of appeals to reverse an 
order of the juvenile court.3 
In sum, Houskeeper, which is indistinguishable from this case, makes clear that the 
court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to directly review the juvenile court's bindover order 
because defendant's appeal was untimely. The court of appeals therefore lacked jurisdiction 
defendant's conditional plea agreement does not change this analysis or result. 
Even though the parties agreed that defendant's plea could be conditioned on his right to 
challenge the juvenile court's bindover order, parties may not by stipulation confer 
subject matter jurisdiction where none exists. See Utah Dep 't. o/Soc. Servs. v. Higgs, 
656 P.2d 998, 1002 (Utah 1982). The State acknowledges, however, that the condition 
for defendant's guilty plea was an impossibility from the beginning because by the time 
defendant entered his plea, the time for moving to reinstate his appeal or filing a new 
notice of appeal had long run. The fact that the guilty plea was conditioned on an 
impossibility may well have been a basis for defendant to move to withdraw or set aside 
the plea. See State v. Arviso, 1999 UT App 381, ^ 9-11, 993 P.2d 894 (defendant should 
be allowed to withdraw a plea where a material basis for the plea bargain is impossible to 
perform). Defendant, however, has never sought this remedy. 
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to reverse the juvenile court or to review the voluntariness of defendant's rule 37(b) 
dismissal.4 
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S POINT LB 
THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT THE COURT OF APPEALS5 
FINDING THAT DEFENDANT DID NOT KNOWINGLY AND 
VOLUNTARILY WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO APPEAL 
Defendant argues that the court of appeals properly concluded that defendant's rule 
37(b) dismissal was not knowing or voluntary. As explained above and in the State's 
opening brief, the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to even address the voluntariness of 
defendant's dismissal. Even if it did have jurisdiction, its finding that defendant's dismissal 
was not knowing or voluntary was unsupported by the record and refuted by defendant's 
sworn affidavit. 
4In a footnote, defendant alternatively suggests that the court of appeals could have 
exercised jurisdiction over his untimely appeal by treating his appeal as a petition for 
extraordinary relief. Br. Resp. 30-31 n.l. Extraordinary relief, however, is available only 
"[w]here no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available." Utah R. Civ. Pro. 
65B(a). See also Osborne v. Adoption Center of Choice, 2003 UT 15, \ 24, 70 P.3d 58. 
"Extraordinary writs were not intended to be used as substitutes for appeal or to 
circumvent the formalities required for an appeal." Wilde v. Third Circuit Court, 655 
P.2d 674, 674 (Utah 1982). Thus, extraordinary relief is precluded where a party simply 
fails to exercise his right to appeal a final order. See Merrihew v. Salt Lake Co. Planning 
& Zoning Comm% 659 P.2d 1065, 1066-67 (Utah 1983) ("By ignoring a plain, speedy, 
and adequate remedy at law [an appeal], the plaintiffs placed themselves out of reach of 
the extraordinary writ of mandamus"). Here, defendant had a plain, speedy, and adequate 
avenue for challenging the juvenile court's bindover order in the form of a direct appeal, 
but he abandoned it. The availability of that remedy, even though defendant chose not to 
pursue it, precludes relief under rule 65B. 
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A. Defendant's affidavit raised a presumption that his dismissal was knowing and 
voluntary. 
Defendant acknowledges, as indeed he must, that a presumption of validity attaches 
to rule 37(b) dismissals of appeals from convictions. Br. Resp. 41-46. See Bruner v. Carver, 
920 P.2d 1153, 115-57 (Utah 1996) (in post-conviction proceeding, applying presumption 
of validity to rule 37(b) dismissal of direct appeal from conviction). He argues, however, 
that the presumption of validity does not attach to a rule 37(b) dismissal of an appeal from 
a juvenile court bindover order because defendant is still presumed innocent. Br. Resp. 45. 
The fact that defendant had not yet been convicted when he dismissed his appeal is 
irrelevant to whether a presumption of validity attached to his rule 37(b) dismissal. This is 
because the presumption of regularity attaches to all final judgments. See Bruner, 920 P.2d 
at 1155 ("'presumption of regularity that attaches to final judgments makes it appropriate to 
assign a proof burden to the defendant'") (quoting Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20,29 (1992)). 
As explained in the State's opening brief, a juvenile court's bindover order under the SYOA 
is a final, appealable order. See Houskeeper, 2002 UT 118, ^ J 23. Once defendant dismissed 
his appeal, the juvenile court bindover order became a final judgment on the merits. See 
Clark, 913 P.2d at 363. Thus, his rule 37(b) dismissal was entitled to the same presumption 
of validity that attached to Bruner's rule 37(b) dismissal. 
But there is another reason why a presumption of validity should attach to defendant's 
rule 37(b) dismissal. As explained above, an appellant who has the right to the effective 
assistance of counsel, as defendant does, can obtain a dismissal of his appeal only if his 
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"motion is accompanied by [his] personal affidavit demonstrating that [his] decision to 
dismiss the appeal is voluntary and made with knowledge of the right to an appeal and an 
understanding of the consequences of voluntary dismissal." Utah R. App. P. 37(b). The 
affidavit requirement was adopted in November 1999. The Advisory Committee Note 
explains the reason for the new requirement: 
Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to the effective assistance 
of counsel. Parties in juvenile court proceedings have a statutory right to 
effective assistance of counsel. To protect these rights and the right to appeal, 
the [affidavit requirement] was added to rule 37(b) to assure that the decision 
to abandon an appeal is an informed choice made by the appellant, not 
unilaterally by appellant's attorney. 
1999 Advisory Committee Note, Utah R. App. P. 37(b) (citations omitted). 
Rule 37(b)'s affidavit requirement, and the reasons for it, show an intent that a 
presumption of validity attach to dismissals obtained by following the rule's provisions. If 
a presumption of validity does not attach, then there is no reason for the affidavit 
requirement. Thus, notwithstanding defendant's and the court's of appeals arguments, 
defendant's dismissal of his appeal must be presumed knowing and voluntary. See Bruner, 
920 P.2d at 1157 ("Where, as here, an affidavit by the defendant accompanies the stipulation 
to withdraw the direct appeal, due process does not require this court to make an independent 
investigation to verify the understanding of the withdrawing party"). 
B. The record did not rebut the presumption of validity created by defendant's 
affidavit 
Defendant contends that even if a presumption of validity attached to his dismissal, 
that presumption was rebutted by the trial court's misstatements regarding the appellate 
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process and jurisdiction. Defendant essentially claims that he was misled by the trial court 
into believing that he could reinstate his appeal. 
If defendant unknowingly lost his right to appeal, however, it was not because the trial 
court misinformed him; it was because his attorney misinformed him. Defendant signed his 
affidavit on his attorney's advice after all the trial court's misstatements. The affidavit 
represented that defendant wanted to withdraw his appeal, knew that the appeal could not be 
reinstated, and, most importantly, that he had "consulted with [his] attorney with respect to 
this withdrawal and [felt] that it [would] not benefit [him] to pursue this appeal." See 
Addendum D to State's Opening Brief. 
Defendant's attorney, not the trial court, was charged with correctly advising him 
about his appeal rights and the consequences of his rule 37(b) dismissal. His attorney, not 
the trial court, was charged with taking all necessary steps to protect any appeal right that 
defendant desired to pursue. Thus, if defendant in fact unknowingly or involuntarily lost his 
right to appeal because of the dismissal, it is because his counsel was constitutionally 
ineffective, not because the trial court did not understand correct appellate procedure. 
Defendant has never claimed that his counsel misadvised him or otherwise performed 
deficiently. Nor does the record support such a claim. To the contrary, several record facts 
suggest that counsel's advice to dismiss the appeal was a conscious, strategic, and reasonable 
choice. First, defense counsel clearly knew that the juvenile court bindover order was final 
and appealable, because he filed a timely notice of appeal to preserve his client's right to 
appeal that order. R131:2-5,22,29-30. Second, based on the State's arguments below, 
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defense counsel was aware that it was likely that the district court lacked jurisdiction to 
review the bindover order and that his only avenue for review was a timely direct appeal.5 
R37-43;R131:4,22-27,67-68. Third, the record reveals that both defendant and defense 
counsel had a legitimate reason for choosing not to pursue a direct appeal at that stage of the 
proceedings. Defendant was not eligible for pretrial release because of his illegal 
immigration status. R133:4. Thus, if he had pursued his appeal from the bindover order, he 
would have remained in detention for a year or more until the appeal was finished. 
Defendant and his counsel may well have concluded that he could obtain a speedier release 
by resolving all his claims in the district court. This conclusion was eminently reasonable 
given that the district court had already expressed its belief that the bindover was improper, 
R135:2;R133:7-15;R136:12;R131:12; that defendant could plausibly argue that he was 
guilty, at most, not of the first degree felony he was charged with, but of a lesser crime, 
R133:15;R131:12-18; and that defendant should not be held in adult jail, R133:4-5;R135:5-
9;R136:4-5;R131:69. Indeed, before defendant moved to dismiss his appeal, the district 
court had gone to great lengths to have him held in juvenile detention instead of the adult jail, 
R133:10-13;R136:4-5. All this suggested that even if the district court ruled against 
defendant on the motion to quash, the court was disposed to treat him leniently and likely to 
5Trial counsel was not dependent only on the State for this information. Trial 
counsel informed the district court that he had spoken with LDA's "appellate division 
because [he had] never done anything like this before." R136:12. Defendant's eventual 
appellate attorney was well aware that a juvenile court's bindover order under the SYOA 
was a final, appealable order, having persuaded the court of appeals of that fact in State 
ex. rel M.C., 916 P.2d 914 (Utah App. 1996). 
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give him probation. Thus, defendant and his counsel could reasonably conclude that 
dismissing the appeal and proceeding in district court was defendant's best chance of 
obtaining a speedy release.6 
In short, the court of appeals could not conclude from this record that defendant's 
affidavit was unknowing or involuntary. Accordingly, even if the court of appeals had had 
jurisdiction to reinstate defendant's appeal, it should not have done so on this record. 
CONCLUSION 
The court of appeals should be reversed with an order directing it to dismiss 
defendant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 




L U R A B . D U P A I X 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
6Defendant asserts that the trial court implicitly found that he did not knowingly or 
voluntarily dismiss his appeal when it purported to reinstate defendant's appeal. Br. Aplt. 
40-42. Defendant asks this Court to accept that "finding." In fact, the trial court made no 
such finding. While it assumed that defendant wanted to reinstate his appeal, it did not 
ask defendant if that was so, nor did it hold a hearing or address the significance of 
defendant's rule 37(b) affidavit. In short, it is not reasonable on this record to assume 
that the trial court intended to find that defendant did not knowingly or voluntarily 
dismiss his appeal, particularly where defendant was represented by counsel and filed an 
affidavit assuring the court of appeals that he knew the appeal could not be reinstated. 
25 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this day of Jayruuonj 2005,1 mailed, postage 
prepaid, two accurate copies of the foregoing Reply Brief to: 
Joan C. Watt 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt lake City, Utah 84111 
Counsel for Appellant/Defendant
 r 
26 
